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Postulating that the brain performs approximate Bayesian inference generates principled
and empirically testable models of neuronal function—the subject of much current
interest in neuroscience and related disciplines. Current formulations address inference
and learning under some assumed and particular model. In reality, organisms are often
faced with an additional challenge—that of determining which model or models of
their environment are the best for guiding behavior. Bayesian model averaging—which
says that an agent should weight the predictions of different models according to their
evidence—provides a principled way to solve this problem. Importantly, because model
evidence is determined by both the accuracy and complexity of the model, optimal
inference requires that these be traded off against one another. This means an agent’s
behavior should show an equivalent balance. We hypothesize that Bayesian model
averaging plays an important role in cognition, given that it is both optimal and realizable
within a plausible neuronal architecture. We outline model averaging and how it might
be implemented, and then explore a number of implications for brain and behavior. In
particular, we propose that model averaging can explain a number of apparently suboptimal
phenomena within the framework of approximate (bounded) Bayesian inference, focusing
particularly upon the relationship between goal-directed and habitual behavior.
Keywords: predictive coding, Bayesian inference, habit, interference effect, active inference
INTRODUCTION
The idea, first articulated by Helmholtz, that agents perform
inference based on a generative model of the world, is the subject
of much recent interest in theoretical and experimental neuro-
science (Gregory, 1980; Dayan et al., 1995; Rao and Ballard, 1999;
Summerfield and Egner, 2009; Friston, 2010; Clark, 2012). In
this framework, given a particular model of the world, an agent
needs to perform both inference about hidden variables and learn-
ing about the parameters and hyperparameters of the model
(Figure 1)—processes that are the focus of much recent study
(Friston, 2010; Moran et al., 2013). An equally important consid-
eration however, is determining what model an agent should use
in the first place (Hoeting et al., 1999; Penny et al., 2007). This
gives rise to an additional tier of uncertainty to those customar-
ily treated in the neuroscientific literature (Yu and Dayan, 2005;
Bach and Dolan, 2012)—uncertainty over models. Establishing
the best model to use is a pressing concern because, in many situ-
ations, the causal structure governing the phenomena of interest
is unknown or context dependent (Acuña and Schrater, 2010;
Penny et al., 2013). A Bayesian agent needs to consider its own
uncertainty about which model is best, and make inferences
about evidence for different models, a process known as model
comparison (Figure 1).
Despite its manifest importance, how the brain adjudicates
among models has received little study thus far (though see
Courville et al., 2005; Gershman and Niv, 2012; Penny et al.,
2013). We first briefly describe Bayesian model comparison (a
fuller account is given in the Supplementary Material, Appendix),
noting that it depends upon model evidence, which can be
approximated using neurobiologically plausible predictive cod-
ing schemes (Friston, 2005; Bastos et al., 2012). Crucially, model
evidence can be decomposed into an accuracy component—
reflecting how well the model predicts observed data—and a
(penalizing) complexity component reflecting the computational
cost of the model. Thus, Bayes optimal agents seek both to max-
imize the accuracy of their predictions and to minimize the
complexity of the models they use to generate those predictions
(Jefferys and Berger, 1992). This allows us to formalize heuristic
explanations about selection among different models, based on
resource costs or their relative reliability (Daw et al., 2005), within
a simple and Bayes optimal framework.
The optimal way in which the predictions of different mod-
els can be traded off against one another is given by Bayesian
model averaging. It is thus highly plausible that this opera-
tion is implemented by the brain. We discuss this, together
with the relationship between Bayesian model averaging and a
related procedure—Bayesian model selection. We then discuss
anatomical and behavioral implications of model averaging, and
consider several examples of phenomena that can be parsimo-
niously accounted for by invoking inference over models as a
key component of cognitive function. In particular, we focus on
the process of habit formation, where, with repeated experience,
agents come to rely on simpler models to govern behavior (Dolan
and Dayan, 2013). Casting cognition and behavior in this light
allows us to reconcile the manifest advantages of performing opti-
mal inference with apparently contradictory phenomena such as
bounded rationality (Simon, 1972; Camerer et al., 2004), inter-
ference effects (Stroop, 1935; Tucker and Ellis, 2004), and the
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FIGURE 1 | Cartoon illustrating inference (A), learning (B), and model
comparison (C). Inference requires an agent to alter its beliefs about the
causes (u1,u2) of sensory data (y ) to maximize model evidence (minimize
surprise). Learning also involves the maximization of model evidence, this
time through adjustment of the parameters of the model (the mapping
between hidden causes and observations). Model comparison involves
averaging over—or selecting from—alternative models that can be used for
inference and learning.
formation of apparently goal-insensitive habitual behaviors (Yin
and Knowlton, 2006).
MODEL EVIDENCE AND MODEL COMPARISON
ESTIMATING THE EVIDENCE FOR A MODEL
We start by outlining the calculations necessary to perform
Bayesian model comparison. (these issues are treated more fully
in the Supplementary Material, Appendix). First, it is neces-
sary to define a model space containing the set of models
{mi : i = 1, . . . , I} that are to be compared. Now, given a set of
observations y, it follows from Bayes theorem that the posterior
distribution p(mi|y) over the set of models is given by:
p
(
mi |y
) ∝ p (y |mi
)
p (mi) (1)
This means that model comparison depends on two quantities,
the prior probability of the model p (mi), which we will assume
here to be equal across models, and the model evidence p
(
y |mi
)
.
This is a key result because the model evidence p
(
y |mi
)
is exactly
the quantity that is maximized by approximate Bayesian inference
and learning. Thus, any agent that performs inference and learn-
ing using a particular model of the world necessarily evaluates
(implicitly or explicitly) the exact quantity necessary to compare
it with other models.
The central importance of model evidence for comparing dif-
ferent models has another important consequence that it is useful
to highlight here. Because the model evidence (and approxima-
tions to it such as the variational free energy or Bayesian infor-
mation criterion) contain accuracy and (penalizing) complexity
terms (see Supplementary Material, Appendix), the posterior
probability of different models also reflects a trade-off between
accuracy and complexity. This means that agents will tend to favor
simple models, provided they are accurate and, as we shall argue
below, this can provide a normative explanation for processes
such as habit formation.
Scoring models on more than just the accuracy of their predic-
tions may at first glance seem paradoxical, but in fact the use of a
complexity penalty (sometimes called an “Occam factor”) is cru-
cial for optimal inference. This is because it prevents overfitting,
a situation where an overly complex model becomes sensitive to
noise in the data, limiting its generalization or predictive power
for future observations [for a clear discussion of this see (Bishop,
2006) Chapters 1 and 3]. From another perspective, minimizing
complexity corresponds to the principle of Occam’s razor, where
parsimony mandates postulating no more degrees of freedom
than are required by the evidence (Jefferys and Berger, 1992).
MODEL AVERAGING AND MODEL SELECTION
We now turn to the question of how an agent should use infor-
mation from multiple models of its environment. The optimal
way in which it can use the predictions of different models is
to create a weighted average, with the weight determined by the
posterior probability p(mi|y) of each model (Figure 2). This is
known as Bayesian model averaging (Hoeting et al., 1999; Attias,
2000; Penny et al., 2007). Intuitively, model averaging is optimal
because it uses all available information, weighted according to
its reliability, and in this sense it is closely related to optimal inte-
gration of information within a single model (Ernst and Banks,
2002). Furthermore, it properly accommodates uncertainty over
models in situations where there is no predominant model to
call on.
Bayesian model averaging is often contrasted with Bayesian
model selection, in which only the best model is used (Stephan
et al., 2009). This is suboptimal, but provides a close approxima-
tion to model averaging when one model is strongly favored over
the rest. In fact, model averaging can always be converted into
model selection, as can be seen by changing the softmax param-
eter implicit in Bayesian model averaging (see Supplementary
Material, Appendix). In other words, if one is sufficiently sensi-
tive to differences in model evidence, Bayesian model averaging
and selection will yield the same results. This raises the fasci-
nating possibility that, under appropriate conditions, agents can
vary the sensitivity of the model comparison they perform (see
Model Averaging and Perception). This sensitivity also repre-
sents a potential computational phenotype underlying individual
differences in normal and pathological behavior.
FREE ENERGY AND PREDICTIVE CODING
For certain cases, such as linear Gaussian models, the model
evidence can be calculated analytically, but in general its com-
putation is intractable. This necessitates approximate inference,
most commonly implemented either using variational methods
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Graphical illustration of Bayesian model averaging. To
generate a single Bayes optimal prediction about data y, the predictions
of three models m1−3 are weighted according to their posterior
probabilities [see Equation (A5)]. Here model two has the largest
posterior probability, and thus its prediction is weighted most strongly.
(B) Cartoon explaining interference effects using model comparison. An
agent entertains two models of the world, which make different
predictions about the probability of making an action based on some
movement parameter (x axis). The model probabilities for these are
p (m1) = 0.8 and p (m2) = 0.2 respectively, and the resulting weighted
prediction (magenta) shows an interference effect based on this
weighted averaging [see Equation (A5)].
or sampling [for example Markov Chain Monte Carlo or parti-
cle filtering (Bishop, 2006)]. We focus on variational inference
here, because it is fast and can (in principle) be implemented
within neuronal architectures (Mumford, 1992; Friston, 2005),
making it a plausible account of brain function (Friston, 2005;
Friston et al., 2013). Here, the model evidence is approximated
by the variational free energy, which is minimized during learn-
ing and inference (Figure 1). It is easy to see (see Supplementary
Material, A4 “Free Energy and Model Averaging”) that model
comparison can be performed simply by minimizing the varia-
tional free energy across a set of models, suggesting that it could
be implemented by the brain.
The most popular and developed account of how the brain
might perform variational inference is predictive coding, using
hierarchical generative models embodied in the hierarchical
structure of the brain (Mumford, 1992; Rao and Ballard, 1999;
Friston, 2005, 2008; Bastos et al., 2012) (see Supplementary
Material, A5 “Hierarchical Models and Predictive Coding”). Here,
model comparison is performed by minimizing the precision-
weighted sum of squared prediction errors across a set of models.
On this account, if the brain entertains different models of its
environment, then these need to make converging top-down pre-
dictions of representations in the cortical hierarchy. In some cases,
this target might be in primary sensory areas, but it also seems
likely that different models may make convergent predictions
about higher level representations (the presence or absence of
whole objects, for example). A plausible candidate mechanism for
weighting the predictions of different models is modulation of the
synaptic efficacy of their top-down predictions, either through
synchronous gain or through neuromodulators like dopamine.
This is an important implementational issue, and one we hope
to consider more fully in future work—especially in light of
the somewhat surprising finding that at the level of behavior
dopamine boosts the influence of complex models at the expense
of simpler ones (Wunderlich et al., 2012b).
In summary, we are suggesting that representations at any level
of a hierarchical (predictive coding) model are optimized using
top-down predictions that represent a Bayesian model average.
These predictions are simply the posterior predictions of any
given model weighted by posterior beliefs about the model per
se—beliefs that are directly related to the free energy of each
model.
RELATED WORK
A similar approach to the Bayesian model comparison and aver-
aging described here has been employed in the context of super-
vised learning in mixture of expert models (Jacobs et al., 1991a,b;
Jordan and Jacobs, 1994). These consist of a set of expert net-
works, the outputs of which are weighted by a gating network
and combined according to some fixed rule (Jacobs, 1995), which
can then be used for classification. Our proposal also bears some
resemblance to the MOSAIC model for motor behavior proposed
by Kawato and colleagues (Haruno et al., 2001). In MOSAIC,
agents are equipped with multiple control modules, which con-
sist of paired forward (predictor) and inverse (controller) models.
The weights (“responsibility”) assigned to each module depend
upon the accuracy of the forward model predictions in a particu-
lar context, and are implemented as prior probabilities according
to Bayes rule (Haruno et al., 2001). Motor commands are then the
responsibility weighted sum of the outputs of the set of inverse
models, and—in situations where more than one control module
is assigned a significant responsibility—this may produce simi-
lar interference effects to those described above. Compared with
both these approaches (at least as they are typically formulated),
Bayesian model averaging has the advantage that it considers
model evidence, rather than simply model accuracy, and thus
meets the demands of optimal inference. In the specific domain
of motor control, we note that active (Bayesian) inference formu-
lations require only a single generative model, rather than paired
inverse and forward models (Friston, 2011).
Bayesianmodel averaging itself has been considered in theories
of Bayesian conditioning (Courville et al., 2003, 2005); in which
models with different numbers of latent causes are entertained by
the agent—and their predictions weighted according to the evi-
dence for the different models as in Equation (A5). An interesting
and related approach is taken by Gershman and Niv (2012) where
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instead of averaging the predictions of different models, agents
implement a Bayesian non-parametric model (Rasmussen and
Ghahramani, 2002; Gershman and Blei, 2012), whose complex-
ity adjusts automatically to the data in hand. These proposals are
very close in spirit to the idea presented here, and we note their
ability to account for a number of phenomena that are difficult
to explain using traditional conditioning models like Rescorla-
Wagner learning (Courville et al., 2003, 2005; Gershman and Niv,
2012). It has also recently been proposed that spatial cognition
can be explained using approximate Bayesian inference (Penny
et al., 2013). In this context, different models correspond to dif-
ferent environments, and thus model comparison can be used as
a natural way to perform inference about which environment an
agent finds itself in Penny et al. (2013).
MODEL AVERAGING AND THE BRAIN
Here, we briefly consider the implications of Bayesianmodel aver-
aging for neuroanatomy and development. Much more can (and
needs) to be said about this, but our principal focus here is on
cognition and behavior, so we will restrict ourselves to some key
points:
ANATOMY AND DEVELOPMENT
If agents entertain several models of their environment, in many
cases these are likely to co-exist within the same anatomical
region. For example, one might imagine that—on encountering a
new maze—the hippocampus contains models with many differ-
ent spatial structures (Blum and Abbott, 1996; Penny et al., 2013),
or in other situations that the prefrontal cortex models and com-
pares the evidence for different rules simultaneously (Wallis et al.,
2001; Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007). It also seems likely how-
ever, given the degree of functional specialization seen in the brain
(Zeki et al., 1991)—which itself may arise as a result of approxi-
mate Bayesian inference (Friston, 2005; Friston et al., 2013)—that
model averaging may call on models encoded in different brain
structures (Daw et al., 2005; Graybiel, 2008). One instance of this
may underlie the distinction between goal-directed and habitual
behavior (Yin and Knowlton, 2006), which we consider in more
detail below (for detailed review see Dolan and Dayan, 2013).
Another (perhaps related) examplemight be the apparent compe-
tition between hippocampal (largely spatial) and striatal (largely
cue-based) mechanisms during instrumental learning (Lee et al.,
2008). In general, given that the space of possible models for any
situation is potentially uncountable, it makes sense that both evo-
lution and prior experience should act to narrow the space of
models entertained, and that particular constraints, such as what
features of the environment are considered in the model, should
be instantiated in different structures. One can thus think of the
brain as performing selective model averaging (Heckerman, 1998).
The need to consider different models of the world also pro-
vides an interesting perspective on neurodevelopment. Analogous
to the way in which model parameters are thought be learnt dur-
ing development (Fiser et al., 2010; Berkes et al., 2011), one might
hypothesize that the posterior distribution over models p
(
mi |y
)
becomes increasingly peaked, as learning the best models pro-
ceeds. One might further suppose that some form of Occam’s
window is applied by the brain, in which models below a certain
posterior probability are discarded entirely (Madigan and Raftery,
1994). This makes sense in terms of metabolic and other costs and
might, in part, explain the decline in cortical volume that occurs
with normal ageing (Salat et al., 2004)—since over time agents
come to entertain fewer and fewer models. Different degrees of
sculpting model space (or else differences in the number or types
of models entertained) might then explain regional differences
in synaptic regression, such as the observation that neurodevel-
opmental regression is most pronounced in the prefrontal cortex
(Salat et al., 2004). Recently, synaptic regression during sleep has
been portrayed in terms of model optimization. In this context,
the removal of unnecessary or redundant in synaptic connections
(model parameters) minimizes free energy by reducing model
complexity (Hobson and Friston, 2012).
FREE ENERGY AND RESOURCE COSTS
Awidely invoked constraint on the type and complexity ofmodels
that animals might build of the world is that imposed by resource
or complexity costs. This fits comfortably with minimizing vari-
ational free energy—that necessarily entails a minimization of
complexity (under accuracy constraints). The link between min-
imizing thermodynamic free energy and variational free energy
has again been discussed in terms of complexity minimization—
in the sense that thermodynamic free energy is minimized when
complexity is minimized (Sengupta et al., 2013): neuronal activ-
ity is highly costly from a metabolic point of view (Laughlin et al.,
1998) and for any given phenotype, only a certain volume of neu-
rons (and space) are available within the central nervous system.
It is fairly easy to see that—under plausible assumptions about
how generative models are implemented neuronally—there will
be a high degree of correlation between the complexity of a model
and the resource costs of implementing it. Heuristically, having
a larger number of models or model parameters would require
a larger network of neurons to encode it, which will induce
both metabolic and anatomical costs. Another heuristic follows
if we assume that the brain uses a predictive coding scheme
with explicit biophysical representation of prediction errors. In
this context, minimizing the variational free energy will serve
to reduce overall neuronal activity (prediction error) and hence
metabolic demands. This is because predictive coding minimizes
prediction errors throughout the models hierarchy.
While other factors are undoubtedly going to influence the
computational cost to an organism of implementing a particu-
lar model (there is likely, for example, to be a complex interplay
between complexity and different types of cost like time and space
costs), there is likely to be a strong relationship between com-
plexity costs (as assessed by the variational free energy) and the
metabolic costs to an organism (Sengupta et al., 2013).
MODEL AVERAGING AND MULTIPLE-SYSTEMS MODELS OF
DECISION-MASKING
A recurring theme in theoretical approaches to human decision-
making is that multiple mechanisms are involved in control of
behavior, and there is a considerable body of evidence in sup-
port of such ideas (Kahneman, 2003; Summerfield et al., 2011;
Dolan and Dayan, 2013). We suggest that rather than entirely sep-
arate systems competing for control of behavior, the phenomena
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motivating this tradition can be captured by a view in which
anatomically and functionally dissociable networks embody dif-
ferent types of model [which will often have different hierarchical
depths—and hence complexity (Kiebel et al., 2008)]. Instead of
simple competition behavior can be thought of as resulting from
Bayesian model averaging over the predictions of different mod-
els. This perspective provides a way to ease the tension between
the insight (which goes back at least as far as Plato’s tripartite
soul) thatmultiplemotivations can be discerned in human behav-
ior, and the manifest advantages of being able to act in a unitary
and coherent fashion, particularly if this is approximately Bayes-
optimal. We discuss this briefly below, focusing particularly on
the interplay between simple and complex models in the control
of behavior.
HABITUAL AND GOAL-DIRECTED BEHAVIOR
It is well established that animals exhibit both goal-directed
behavior, in which action selection is flexible and sensitive to
anticipated outcomes, and habitual behavior that is stereotyped
and elicited directly by a preceding stimulus or context (Yin and
Knowlton, 2006; Graybiel, 2008; Dolan and Dayan, 2013). It has
also been shown that the neural substrates of these behaviors
are at least partially dissociable (Adams and Dickinson, 1981;
Hatfield andHan, 1996; Pickens et al., 2003; Izquierdo et al., 2004;
Yin et al., 2004).
Broadly speaking, two mechanisms have been proposed to
explain the emergence of habitual behavior. The first posits the
existence of separate “model-free” and “model-based” reinforce-
ment learning schemes in different parts of the brain (the dor-
solateral striatum and prefrontal cortex) (Daw et al., 2005) that
support habitual and goal-directed behavior respectively (Dolan
and Dayan, 2013). Which of these two systems controls behavior
is determined by their relative uncertainties (Daw et al., 2005),
and the emergence of habitual behavior over time results from
themodel-free system having an asymptotically lower uncertainty
than the model-based system. A second hypothesis (though one
rarely spelled out explicitly) is that the existence of habits reflects
a need to minimize some form of computational, metabolic or
attentional cost (Moors and De Houwer, 2006). Once an action
has been repeated many times, it comes to be elicited automat-
ically by a particular stimulus or context, removing the need
for costly deliberation (these explanations may not be entirely
separate from one another, since, as pointed out by one of our
reviewers, one reason for the presence of significant noise in the
model-based system could be the resource cost of performing
complex searches).
Both these hypotheses have much to recommend them, but
neither provides a wholly satisfactory account of habit formation.
To take the “arbitration by uncertainty” hypothesis first; while
the insight that different models of the environment should be
traded off against one another—through the accuracy of their
predictions—is important, this seems insufficient to explain a
transition to habitual behavior in many situations. More specif-
ically, in most (if not all) habit learning experiments, the environ-
ment that the agent has to represent is extremely simple (pressing
a lever to gain a food pellet, knowing whether to turn left or right
in a cross maze). In such contexts it seems prima facie implausible
that explicit cognitive representations induce a sufficiently large
degree of uncertainty so as to be dominated by simple ones [we
note that the transition to habitual behavior in Daw et al.’s sim-
ulations requires that an arbitrary noise component be used to
inflate the uncertainty of the model-based scheme (Daw et al.,
2005)]. We suggest that differential uncertainty alone is insuffi-
cient to provide a satisfying account of the emergence of habitual
behavior. The “cost” hypothesis, by contrast, is inadequate as
things stand, because it does not specify in what situations the
increased resources necessary for an explicit representation of the
environment are justified (or conversely, when the cost of extra
complexity is too high).
An alternative hypothesis is that habit formation comes about
as the result of Bayesian model averaging between simple (hier-
archically shallow) models and more complicated ones involving
richer (hierarchically deep) and more flexible representations of
the environment (Kiebel et al., 2008; Wunderlich et al., 2012a).
The critical observation is that in Bayesian model comparison
models are scored according to both their accuracy and complex-
ity. This means that whilst initially behavior is based largely upon
complex models, that are able to generate accurate predictions
based on little or no experience, over time simpler models come
to predominate, provided their predictions are sufficiently accu-
rate. This will be the case in the stable environments that support
habit formation (Figure 3). Bayesian model averaging therefore
provides a principled framework that incorporates the insights
of both uncertainty- and cost-based explanations, and remedies
their defects. On the one hand, model comparison explains why
habit formation occurs even in very simple environments that are
unlikely to induce significant uncertainty in explicit cognitive rep-
resentations. The use of simple models will always be favored by
the brain, provided those models are accurate enough. Informally,
this may explain why it is so difficult to suppress learnt habits
and other forms of simple stimulus-response behaviors, such as
the tendency to approach appetitive stimuli and avoid aversive
ones (Guitart-Masip et al., 2011). Very simple models have a very
low complexity cost, which means they do not have to be espe-
cially accurate in order to be selected for prescribing behavior. On
the other hand, invoking model comparison allows us to precisely
specify the currency in which different models should be traded
off against one another, and provide (in theory at least) a pre-
cise account of when increased complexity is justified by increased
accuracy, and vice versa.
What then, would constitute evidence for the model aver-
aging hypothesis? The strongest grounds, perhaps, are those
already described—the extensive body of work characterizing
the emergence of habitual behavior, which seems best captured
by a view that makes allowance for both model accuracy and
model complexity. However, some important recent work using
model-based neuroimaging also provides strong support for our
hypothesis (Daw et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2014). Both these studies
involve asking subjects to perform moderately complex learn-
ing tasks, where behavior reflected a combination of both simple
(stimulus-response or model-free like) and more complicated
(action-outcome or model-based like) models of the environ-
ment. Similar findings have been reported by Wunderlich et al.
(2012b), Otto et al. (2013) and Smittenaar et al. (2013). In the
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FIGURE 3 | This schematic illustrates the possibility that a more
complex model may have greater model evidence at the start of
learning but will then give way to a simpler model as their parameters
are optimized. The upper panels show the learning-related improvement in
accuracy and complexity for a complex model (left panel) and a simple
model (right panel). The model evidence is shown as the difference (pink
areas). The more complex model explains the data more accurately but with
a greater complexity cost, that is finessed during the learning. Conversely,
the simpler model will always have a lower accuracy but can (with learning)
attain greater model evidence—and thereby be selected by Bayesian model
averaging as time proceeds and the active inference becomes habitual.
context of such tasks, model averaging makes two clear predic-
tions. The first is that the control of behavior will be biased toward
simple models, once the effects of uncertainty are accounted for.
The second is that because the predictions of simple and com-
plex models are unified, there should be evidence of unified (and
appropriate weighted) prediction error signals in the brain.
It turns out that both these predictions are borne out by the
experimental data. The behavioral modeling presented in Lee
et al. strongly suggests that subjects show a bias toward rely-
ing on simple models over complex ones (the model-free system
over the model-based one in the terminology they employ) (Lee
et al., 2014). This is exactly what one would expect if both com-
plexity and accuracy are taken into account. (Daw et al. did not
report the results of any similar analysis). Turning to the second
prediction Lee et al. report evidence that value signals derived
from simple and complex models are integrated in a contextually
appropriate way in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Lee et al.,
2014). Equally importantly, rather than finding separate predic-
tion error signals at outcome presentation for the simple and
complex models, Daw et al. instead reported an integrated signal
in the ventral striatum, with the strength of expression of the
different prediction errors correlated with the relative influence
they had over behavior (Daw et al., 2011). Both these findings
are precisely in accord with the view that the predictions of sim-
ple and complex models are subject to Bayesian model averaging
during decision-making. Clearly, the explanation for habit for-
mation on offer is a hypothesis that will need to be tested using
simulations and empirical studies; for example, using devalua-
tion paradigms of the sort addressed in Daw et al. (2005)—as
suggested by one of our reviewers.
HABITS AND BEHAVIORAL FLEXIBILITY
The view of habit formation presented here is also consistent
with recent discussions that have stressed the flexibility of habit-
ual behavior, and the complex relationship between habitual
and goal-directed action (Bernácer and Giménez-Amaya, 2013;
Bernácer et al., 2014). Although habitual behavior results from
the use of hierarchically shallowmodels that do not include infor-
mation about the higher order goals of an organism, they can,
under appropriate conditions, instantiate complex links between
external stimuli and behavior of the type manifest when perform-
ing tasks like driving or playing the piano, rather than just simple
stimulus-response mappings. Using shallow models to perform a
particular task also frees up neuronal circuits at deeper hierarchi-
cal levels, potentially enabling them to be employed in other tasks.
Thus, whilst habit formation reduces the flexibility of behavior
on a particular task, it may simultaneously increase the overall
behavioral repertoire available to the agent. For example, whilst
it is difficult for people in the early stages of learning to drive to
simultaneously hold a conversation, experienced drivers find this
easy. This raises the interesting possibility that, rather than always
being antithetical to goal-directed behavior, considered from the
perspective of the entire agent, habit formation often enables
it. A Bayesian perspective also provides an explanation for how
habitual behaviors can be at the same time apparently uncon-
scious and automatic, and yet also rapidly become subject to
conscious awareness and goal-directed control when something
unexpected occurs (if the brake pedal of the car suddenly stops
working, for example) (Bernácer et al., 2014). This occurs because
the shallow model generating habitual control of behavior sud-
denly becomes a poor predictor of current and future sensory
information, necessitating the switch to a more complex, flexible
model.
INTERFERENCE EFFECTS, AFFORDANCES, AND PAVLOVIAN
RESPONSES
It has been well documented that human behavior, across a wide
variety of domains, shows evidence of what are usually called
“interference effects” (Stroop, 1935; Simon et al., 1990; Tipper
et al., 1997; Tucker and Ellis, 2004; Guitart-Masip et al., 2011).
Typically, these are manifest when subjects are asked to make
responses based on one attribute or dimension of a stimulus,
but show behavioral impairments, such as slower responding
or increased error rates, that can be attributed to a different
attribute. Examples of this include the affordance compatibil-
ity effect (Tucker and Ellis, 2004), the “Pavlovian” tendency to
approach appetitive and avoid aversive stimuli (Dayan, 2008;
Guitart-Masip et al., 2011; Huys et al., 2011) and the effect
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of distractors during reaching (Tipper et al., 1997; Welsh and
Elliott, 2004). A closely related phenomenon is that of task switch-
ing effects, where subjects’ performance is impaired immediately
after being asked to swap between performing different tasks
(Monsell, 2003).
These effects are generally considered to result from the exis-
tence of multiple mechanisms for controlling action (or alter-
natively, task sets) engaged in more or less blind competition
(Dayan, 2008), a scenario virtually guaranteed to produce sub-
optimal behavior. The arguments presented here suggest another
possibility; namely, that such phenomena are the manifestation
of agents pursuing a model averaging strategy that is in general
optimal, but produces suboptimal behavior in the context of non-
ecological experiments (Figure 2). There is a natural parallel with
perceptual illusions here, since these result from the application
of generally appropriate prior beliefs to situations designed such
that these beliefs are inappropriate (Weiss et al., 2002; Shams
et al., 2005; Brown and Friston, 2012). To return to the affor-
dance competition and Pavlovian bias effects mentioned above,
it seems reasonable to suppose that subjects simultaneously call
on a model of their environment induced by the (non-ecological)
task demands, and an entrenched (and simpler) model linking
stimulus properties like object affordances and stimulus valence
to behavioral responding. Since the predictions of these models
are averaged, the influence of the simpler models is suppressed,
but not entirely attenuated, producing characteristic effects on
behavior (Figure 3). This is a hypothesis we will consider more
fully in future work. Task switching effects can also naturally be
explained, on the hypothesis that models that have recently pro-
vided accurate predictions have been accorded a higher posterior
probability that is only partially suppressed during switching.
MODEL AVERAGING IN OTHER COGNITIVE DOMAINS
We now turn to considering the consequences of, and evidence
for, Bayesian model comparison and averaging in other areas of
cognition. We confine our discussion to a small number of exam-
ples but we suspect that these ideas may have much broader
applicability to other cognitive domains (and perhaps beyond
(Friston, 2010, 2012)).
MODEL AVERAGING AND PERCEPTION
In certain contexts, perception does indeed show the hallmark
of model averaging, namely integration between the predictions
of different plausible models. Famous examples of this include
the McGurk and ventriloquist effects (McGurk and MacDonald,
1976; Bertelson et al., 2000), in which distinct representations (for
example of phonemes in theMcGurk effect) are fused into a single
percept that is a combination of the two. However, there is also a
large literature describing multistability in perception, for exam-
ple in the face-vase illusion and the Necker cube (Sterzer et al.,
2009). Here distinct hypotheses about the world clearly alternate
rather than co-existing (Dayan, 1998; Hohwy et al., 2008). A nat-
ural explanation for this in the framework we have suggested here
is that agents perform apply model averaging with a high sensitiv-
ity parameter (see Supplementary Material, A2 “Bayesian Model
Averaging”). This effectively implements Bayesian model selec-
tion, and ensures that only the predictions of a single preferred
model are used. Other explanations are also possible, for example
that multistability results from sampling from different models
(Gershman et al., 2012) or, as suggested by one of our reviewers,
from strong negative covariance between the prior probabilities
of different models.
It is unclear precisely why—in some contexts—perception
should exhibit integration, and in others multistability, but one
attractive possibility is that this is determined by the extent to
which an integrated percept is, in itself, plausible. Thus the fused
percepts produced by the McGurk and ventriloquist illusions
reflect plausible hidden states of the world. By contrast, the inter-
mediate state of a Necker cube, or Rubin’s face-vase illusion would
be implausible, if not impossible; suggesting that in these contexts
agents should preclude perceptual integration by increasing the
strictness of their model comparison.
EXPERIENCE AND BOUNDED RATIONALITY
Although in some (particularly perceptual) contexts, human
behavior closely approximates the best possible performance
(Ernst and Banks, 2002), in many situations it falls well short of
this, giving rise to the suggestion that humans are bounded ratio-
nal decision-makers (Simon, 1972; Kahneman, 2003) rather than
perfectly rational; particularly when it comes to economic choice.
Bounded rationality means that decision-making is as good as
possible, given constraints of one kind or another. A phenomenon
is found in theories of social interaction, where it has been shown
that humans are able to consider only a (perhaps surprisingly)
limited number of levels of recursion on interpersonal choice
tasks (Stahl andWilson, 1995; Camerer et al., 2004; Yoshida et al.,
2008; Coricelli and Nagel, 2009).
These specific examples illustrate a more general point. If
models are weighted or chosen according to their evidence rather
than simply their accuracy, then one should not necessarily
expect agents to perform tasks with extremely high levels of
accuracy even if they are Bayes optimal. This is because approxi-
mate Bayesian inference naturally introduces bounded rationality,
since it trades off accuracy (rationality) against complexity (cost).
On this view, there are two key determinants of whether agents
employ complex models (and hence approximate ideal behavior
on tasks where these are necessary). The first is the amount of
experience the agent has with a particular task or environment.
More experience (equivalent to collecting a large data set in a
scientific experiment) allows the increased accuracy of its pre-
dictions to outweigh the complexity penalty of a complex model
(Courville et al., 2003). The second determinant is the gain in
accuracy per observation associated with using the more complex
model. This picture fits, at least approximately with what is actu-
ally observed in human behavior, where near-ideal performance
is often observed in perceptual tasks (which presumably employ
models that are used extremely frequently) and suboptimal per-
formance more typically seen in tasks such as abstract reasoning,
which are performed less often.
This perspective relates to recent work showing that bounded
rationality can be derived from a free energy formulation,
where model complexity is introduced by the need to process
information in order to perform inference (Ortega and Braun,
2013). Model comparison, as performed by gradient ascent on
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variational free energy, supplements this insight by explaining
how the Bayes-optimal model of the environment arises.
OTHER ISSUES
WHERE DOES THE MODEL SPACE COME FROM?
One issue we have not touched on is how models are created
in the first place. This is a deep and challenging topic, whose
proper consideration falls outside the scope of this piece. One easy
answer is that the space of possible models is constrained by phy-
logeny and thus ultimately by natural selection, which can itself
be thought of in terms of free energy minimization (Kaila and
Annila, 2008). From the perspective of neuroscience, this is at the
same time true and unsatisfying. To understand how new models
are generated within the lifetime of an organism (and a fortiori
on the timescale of laboratory experiments), it is interesting to
consider structure learning (Heckerman, 1998; Needham et al.,
2007; Braun et al., 2010; Tenenbaum et al., 2011). Structure learn-
ing deals with the problem of how to infer dependencies between
hidden variables, and allows inferences to be drawn about both
the specific model structure (Heckerman, 1998; Tenenbaum et al.,
2011) and the general structural form (for example a ring, tree
or hierarchy) (Kemp and Tenenbaum, 2008) most appropriate
for a dataset. From our perspective, this is simply the problem
of Bayesian model selection applied to probabilistic graphical
models. This approach has been used with remarkable success to
explore inductive learning and concept acquisition (Tenenbaum
et al., 2011). The issue of how to select the correct hidden variables
in the first place has been less well explored, at least in cogni-
tive science (though see Collins and Koechlin, 2012; Gershman
and Niv, 2012), but one solution to this problem is provided
by Bayesian non-parametric models that entertain, in princi-
ple, an infinite model space (Rasmussen and Ghahramani, 2002;
Gershman and Blei, 2012).
A clear prediction of structure learning models is that pre-
viously acquired structures may be utilized on novel tasks, as
manifested by “learning to learn,” where new tasks with the same
structure as previously experienced ones are learnt faster. This
pattern of behavior has been repeatedly demonstrated in animal
experiments (Harlow, 1949; Schrier, 1984; Langbein and Siebert,
2007), as well as those involving human children and adults
(Duncan, 1960; Hultsch, 1974; Brown and Kane, 1988; Halford
et al., 1998; Acuña and Schrater, 2010), as usefully reviewed
in Braun et al. (2010). The same phenomenon has also been
rediscovered recently by memory researchers, and described in
terms of cognitive schema (Tse et al., 2007; van Kesteren et al.,
2012). This means that, given the constraints of their pheno-
type, adult organisms are likely to have already acquired a large
number of possible structures (Kemp and Tenenbaum, 2008;
Tenenbaum et al., 2011), which they can use to model the world,
and model comparison can thus proceed considering only this
reduced model space.
SIGNATURES OF MODEL COMPARISON
An interesting practical question is how we distinguish between
separate models, and different parts of a single more complicated
model. This is particularly pertinent, because as we have discussed
elsewhere (see Supplementary Material, A4 “Free Energy and
Model Averaging”), performing variational inference on model
probabilities effectively involves embedding them within a larger
hierarchical model. On one level, this question is a philosophical
one, but in the context of specific cognitive or neuronal hypothe-
ses we take it that what is useful to consider as separate models
will generally be fairly clear in terms of functional anatomy
[for example, the anatomical dissociation between the neuronal
mechanisms underlying goal-directed and habitual behavior dis-
cussed earlier (Yin and Knowlton, 2006)]. More concretely, we
can point to the fact that complexity plays a key role in adjudi-
cating among different models, but not when weighting different
kinds of information within a model (Deneve and Pouget, 2004),
and suggest that if behavior shows clear evidence of a bias toward
using simple models (as in habit-formation), then this is evidence
that model evidence is being used to optimize behavior.
ACTIVE SAMPLING AND MODEL COMPARISON
Although—for the sake of simplicity—we have only considered
static models in our theoretical discussion, the principles out-
lined can be easily extended to incorporate extended timeframes
and dynamics by minimizing the path-integral of the variational
free energy (or the action) over time (Feynman, 1964; Friston,
2008; Friston et al., 2008). Given a particular model, this leads
naturally to active sampling of the world in such a way as to
minimize uncertainty about its parameters (hypothesis testing)
(Friston et al., 2012a). In the context of uncertainty over mod-
els, a similar process should occur; with agents actively sampling
sensory data in order to disambiguate which model of the world
(hypothesis) is best [a beautiful example of this is Eddington’s
test of general relativity using gravitational lensing (Dyson et al.,
1920)]. This notion is supported by recent work showing that
in a sequential decision-making context, human subjects trade
off reward minimization against gaining information about the
underlying structure of the task (Acuña and Schrater, 2010).
MODEL COMPARISON AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
A number of psychiatric disorders are associated with symptoms
such as delusions and hallucinations which seem likely to reflect
dysfunctional models of their environment (Fletcher and Frith,
2008; Adams et al., 2013; Brown et al., 2013). In some cases this
might be the product of pathological learning of the parameters
of particularmodels, but it is also conceivable that impairments in
the ability to adequately comparemodels (tomake or utilize infer-
ences about model probabilities) might underlie some deficits.
This is also a promising area for future study.
SUMMARY
In this paper we suggest, based on both theoretical grounds
and consideration of behavioral and neuroscientific evidence,
that the brain entertains multiple models of its environment,
which it adjudicates among using the principles of approximate
Bayesian inference. We discussed these principles, which can be
implemented in a neurobiologically plausible way using predic-
tive coding (Friston, 2005). Finally, we argue that a number of
disparate behavioral and neuroscientific observations are well
explained by invoking Bayesian model averaging, focusing par-
ticularly on habitual vs. goal-directed control, and why simple
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models often prevail over more sophisticated ones. We anticipate
that this perspective may be useful for hypothesis generation and
data interpretation across a number of fields treating both normal
function and psychiatric disease.
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